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Casenotes
AN EXPANSION OF CORPORATE SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
UNDER CERCLA: UNITED STATES v DISTLER
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 25, 1988, the United States government com-
menced two actions against Angell Manufacturing Corporation
(Angell II),' a successor corporation, pursuant to section
107(a)(3) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).2 The government sought
to recover past, present and future CERCLA costs incurred in re-
sponse to the cleanup of hazardous substances at properties then
owned by Angell II and previously owned by Donald Distler.3 In
response, Angell II filed a motion to dismiss the actions claiming
that it was not a proper party for the suits. 4
In United States v. Distler, the United States District Court for
the Western District of Kentucky addressed the issue of corporate
successor liability under CERCLA section 107(a)(3) which defines
persons liable for response costs incurred in the cleanup of haz-
1. United States v. Distler, 741 F. Supp. 637 (W.D. Ky. 1990).
2. Section 107(a)(3) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) provides in pertinent part: "person who
by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or ar-
ranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous
substances owned or possessed by such person" shall be liable for costs of clean-
ing up the hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1986) (emphasis ad-
ded). For a general discussion of CERCLA, see infra notes 49-70 and
accompanying text.
3. The actions concerned two separate properties: one action sought to re-
cover response costs incurred by the United States at a farm in Jefferson County,
Kentucky; the other action sought to recover response costs incurred at an aban-
doned brickyard in Hardin County, Kentucky. See Supplemental Response Brief
for Plaintiff at 1, United States v. Distler, 741 F. Supp. 637 (W.D. Ky. 1990) (No.
C88-0200 LU)). Donald Distler and Kentucky Liquid Recycling had previously
operated the properties. See Brief for Defendant at 1, United States v. Distler,
741 F. Supp. 637 (W.D. Ky. 1990) (No. C88-0200 L(A) & C88-0201 L(A)). The
government alleged that the materials deposited at the two locations were "haz-
ardous substances" within the meaning of CERCLA and that Angell Manufac-
turing Company had contracted with Donald Distler and Kentucky Liquid
Recycling to transport and dispose of the hazardous substances. See Response
Brief for Plaintiff at 2, United States v. Distler, 741 F. Supp. 637 (W.D. Ky. 1990)
(No. C88-0200 L(A) & C88-0201 L(A)). In addition, the government alleged
that the two locations in dispute were "facilities" as defined under CERCLA. Id.
4. Distler, 741 F. Supp. at 638.
(205)
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ardous waste sites.5 The case is one of first impression as to the
application of the appropriate doctrine of successor liability in a
CERCLA context and represents an expansion of liability under
CERCLA.6
In Distler, the court denied Angell II's motion to dismiss the
government's claim for response costs finding Angell II liable
under CERCLA section 107(a)(3) as a successor corporation. 7
The court applied a version of the doctrine of successor liability
which extended liability under CERCLA to include successor cor-
porations which are not expressly covered by the statute.8 The
court imposed successor liability in an attempt to further CER-
CLA's remedial purpose. 9
This Note analyzes the Distler decision in light of recent
trends in the courts toward expanding corporate successor liabil-
ity in the area of asset acquisitions.' 0 In addition, this Note exam-
ines the failure of courts to develop a consistent doctrine to be
applied uniformly to all asset purchases. This inconsistency
causes successor liability to be one of the most significant un-
resolved issues under CERCLA due to its potential for affecting
every situation in which hazardous assets have been transferred.
Finally, this Note contends that it is the responsibility of Congress
to explicitly define the boundaries of successor liability under
CERCLA in order to avoid further confusion among courts in in-
5. Id. For statutory language of CERCLA section 107(a)(3), see supra note
2.
6. Id. at 641. But see United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 739 F.
Supp. 1030 (E.D.N.C. 1989) (applied continuity of business enterprise exception
in situation where successor had knowledge of potential liability, but failed to
address rationale behind application of expanded doctrine of successor liability).
For a discussion of continuity of business enterprise exception, see infra notes
46-48 and accompanying text.
7. DistLer, 741 F. Supp. at 642-43. For a discussion of the traditional doc-
trine of successor liability and its exceptions, see infra notes 13-23 and accompa-
nying text.
8. Id. at 643. The traditional doctrine of successor liability imposes liability
on the purchaser of assets only to the extent of liabilities expressly assumed by
the purchaser. Id. An exception to this rule applies when the purchasing corpo-
ration is, in essence, the same corporation as that of its predecessor. Id. Distler
expanded the application of this "mere continuation" exception by imposing
liability under the continuity of business enterprise exception and, in doing so,
disposed of the necessity of requiring a continuity of shareholder interest. Id.
9. Id. The court stated that "[allthough a majority of jurisdictions may
presently adhere to [traditional] constructions of the doctrine of successor liabil-
ity, where to do so would conflict with Congressional intent, [this] court is
bound to seek an application which would avoid such conflict." Id.
10. For a discussion of the development of the expansion of corporate suc-
cessor liability, see infra notes 28-48 and accompanying text.
2
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terpreting which persons are accountable under CERCLA and in
order to ensure that the remedial policies underlying the statute
are advanced.
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE
OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
This section will discuss the common law or traditional doc-
trine of successor liability along with its exceptions." Specifi-
cally, this section will cover the "mere continuation" exception
and the more liberal "continuity of business enterprise"
exception. 12
A. Traditional Doctrine of Corporate Successor Liability
The doctrine of corporate successor liability has developed
from traditional common law principles on the assumption that a
corporation is an entity which is separate and distinct from its
shareholders.' 3 Therefore, changes in ownership of a corpora-
tion's stock do not affect the obligations of the corporation
itself.14
Under common law, the liability of a successor corporation is
invariably dependent upon the type of transaction contemplated
by the corporation and its successors.1 5 Generally, when one cor-
11. For a discussion of the common law doctrine of successor liability and
its accompanying exceptions, see infra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the mere continuation exception and continuity of
business enterprise exception, see infra notes 24-48 and accompanying text.
13. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex, 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989). Successor liability is a deeply rooted
principle of common law. Id. In Smith Land, the court emphasized the continuity
of existence that is inherent in the corporate entity. The court stated in perti-
nent part:
[A]II the individual members that have existed from the foundation to
the present time, or that shall hereafter exist, are but one person in law,
a person that never dies; in like manner as the river Thames is still the
same river, though the parties which compose it are changing every
instant.
Id. at 91. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 467-69 (quoting Polius v. Clark
Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 77 (5th Cir. 1986)). For a further discussion of Smith
Land, see infra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
14. Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 91.
15. See generally 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations §§ 2704-2705 (1986); 15 W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAw OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 7122-7123
(rev. perm. ed. 1983 & Supp. 1990) [hereinafter FLETCHER]; Annotation, Similar-
ity of Ownership or Control as Basis for Charging Corporation Acquiring Assets of Another
with Liability for Former Owner's Debts, 49 A.L.R.3d 881, 883 (1973). A corporation
can transfer ownership through a sale of its stock, a sale of its assets, a merger,
or a consolidation with another entity. FLETCHER § 7122. Generally, when a
sale of stock, a merger, or a consolidation occurs, the original corporate entity
19921
3
Girard: An Expansion of Corporate Successor Liability Under CERCLA: Unite
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
208 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. III: p. 205
poration purchases the assets of another, that corporation is ac-
countable only to the extent of the liabilities expressly assumed in
the acquisition agreement.' 6 This general rule is based upon the
premise that when one corporation sells its assets, it transfers an
interest distinct from that of the corporate entity itself.' 7 The ra-
tionale for the rule is to protect a bona fide purchaser from liabili-
ties caused by a predecessor corporation of which the bona fide
purchaser was unaware at the time of acquisition.' 8
This common law rule of nonliabilty, however, is subject to
four exceptions. 19 The exceptions apply (1) when there has been
an express or implied assumption of liability by the purchasing
corporation;20 (2) when the transaction amounts to an actual or
remains substantially intact. Id. For example, the liabilities of the previous own-
ership form are retained in the new corporate entity. Id. By contrast, however,
when a sale of assets occurs, only those liabilities expressly assumed are trans-
ferred over to the new corporate entity. Id. A merger occurs when one of the
combining entities remains in existence; a consolidation occurs when a new en-
tity is borne out of the combination of two or more entities. Id.
16. FLETCHER, supra note 15, § 7122, at 232 ("factual conclusion that the
transferee corporation is a continuation of the transferor corporation does not
inexorably lead to the legal conclusion that the transferee is therefore liable for
the transferor's obligations").
17. Id.
18. Id. ("[I]f a corporation goes through a mere change in form without a
significant change in substance, it should not be allowed to escape liability.") (em-
phasis added).
The general rule of nonliability is also used as a device to protect the rights
of commercial creditors. Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811, 815-16
(N.J. 1981). The court held that "courts have come to recognize that the tradi-
tional rule of nonliability was developed . . . to protect the rights of commercial
creditors and dissenting shareholders following corporate acquisitions, as well
as to determine successor corporation liability for tax assessments and contrac-
tual obligations of the predecessor."
19. See generally Golden State Bottling Co. v. N.L.R.B., 414 U.S. 168 n.5
(1973); FLETCHER, supra note 15, §§ 7122-7123, at 232, 262.
Courts have also recognized a fifth exception, the product line exception.
See, e.g., Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 11 (Cal. 1977)("party which acquires a
manufacturing business and continues the output of its line of products ...
assumes strict tort liability for defects in units of the same product line previ-
ously manufactured and distributed by the entity from which the business was
acquired"); FLETCHER, supra note 15, § 7123.07, at 278-80. The products line
exception has been adopted in only a few states. See Brief for Defendant at 22
(No. C88-0200 L(A) & C88-0201 L(A)). See, e.g., Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3
(Cal. 1977); Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 11 (NJ. 1981); Dawejko v.
Jorgensen Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106 (Pa. Super. 1981). Most courts, however,
have expressly declined to follow this exception. See Brief for Defendant at 22
(No. C88-0200 L(A) & C88-0201 L(A)).
20. This exception applies where the successor's conduct represents an in-
tention to pay the predecessor's debt. FLETCHER, supra note 15, §§ 7114-7115,
7122. See also Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, 909 F.2d 1260, 1264 (9th Cir.
1990); Goldstein v. Gardner, 444 F. Supp. 581, 583 (N.D. Ill. 1978) ("buyer of
4
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de facto merger;2' (3) when there is evidence that the transfer
was fraudulent or lacking in good faith;2 2 or (4) when the trans-
feree corporation is, in reality, a mere continuation of the
transferor. 23
B. The Mere Continuation Exception
A mere continuation of the transferor exists when there is a
continuation of officers, directors, stockholders and general busi-
ness operations between the selling and purchasing corporations
with only one corporation remaining after the transaction is com-
pleted. 24 A successor corporation falls within the purview of this
exception if after the transfer of assets, the identity of the stock,
stockholders and directors remains constant. 25 The extent of this
exception has been defined by courts.2 6 In particular, some
assets can avoid implied assumption of liabilities by enumerating liabilities as-
sumed and explicitly excluding assumption of liabilities not enumerated").
21. See generally FLETCHER, supra note 15, § 7122, at 232. This exception,
however, only pertains when the assets of the predecessor corporation are trans-
ferred for shares of stock.
A merger occurs when one company acquires another company resulting in
one corporate entity. Id. A de facto merger occurs when the substance of the
agreement results in a merger, regardless of title put on it by the merging corpo-
rations. See In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings re Al-
leged PCB Pollution, 712 F. Supp. 1010, 1014-15 (D. Mass. 1989). The de facto
merger doctrine is a judicial doctrine created for avoiding inequities. Id. at
1015. The doctrine is most often employed in relation to shareholder voting
and appraisal rights. Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 877
(Mich. 1976).
Courts have recognized de facto mergers when:
(1) there is a continuation of the enterprise of the seller in terms of
continuity of management, personnel, physical location, assets, and
operations;
(2) there is a continuity of shareholders;
(3) the seller ceases operations, liquidates, and dissolves as soon as
legally and practically possible; and
(4) the purchasing corporation assumes the obligations of the
seller necessary for uninterrupted continuation of business operations.
Louisiana-Pacific, 909 F.2d at 1264 (citations omitted). See also United States v.
Vertac Chem. Corp., 671 F. Supp. 595, 616 (E.D. Ark. 1987).
22. FLETCHER, supra note 15, § 7122, at 232.
23. Id. A mere continuation occurs when the successor corporation retains
the same officers, directors, and stock and only one corporation remains after
the sale of assets. Id. For a discussion of the mere continuation exception, see
infra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
24. Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 1977). Under the
mere continuation exception, a successor corporation is liable when it is, in es-
sence, the same corporate entity as that of its predecessor. Mozingo v. Correct
Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 174-75 (5th Cir. 1985).
25. Mozingo, 752 F.2d at 174-75.
26. See, e.g., id. at 174-75. Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 447 (7th
Cir. 1977); Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977); Turner v. Bituminous
5
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courts have broadened the scope of liability under the exception,
creating a more expansive exception; the continuity of business
enterprise exception. 27
C. Expansion of Corporate Successor Liability
In the area of products liability, the application of the tradi-
tional doctrine of corporate successor liability has led some
courts to loosen the criteria needed to fall within the boundaries
of the exceptions to the doctrine in order to avoid an otherwise
harsh or unjust result.28 Indeed, the mere continuation exception
has been expanded by certain courts to include an element of
public policy. 29 Other courts have broadened liability by aban-
doning the traditional rule of nonliabilty altogether and have es-
tablished successor liability based upon a continuation of the
predecessor's business operations. 30 In these instances, liability
Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976). The Ray court held that in order to
find that a corporation which acquires the assets of another corporation is a
mere continuation of its predecessor and therefore impose liability upon the
purchaser for the predecessor's debts, a showing of one of the following ele-
ments must be made: "(1) no adequate consideration was given for the prede-
cessor corporation's assets and made available for meeting the claims of the
unsecured creditors; [or] (2) one or more persons were officers, directors or
stockholders of both corporations." 560 P.2d at 7.
27. Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., Inc., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974); United States
v. Carolina Transformer Co., Inc., 739 F. Supp. 1030 (E.D.N.C. 1989). For a
discussion of the continuity of business enterprise exception, see infra notes 28-
48 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1977); Cyr v. B.
Offen & Co., Inc. 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974); Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3
(Cal. 1977); Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976).
The Turner court held that:
[t]o the injured persons the problem of recovery is substantially the
same, no matter what corporate process led to transfer of the first cor-
poration and/or its assets.... [T]he injured person has the same prob-
lem, so long as the first corporation in each case legally and/or
practically becomes defunct. [H]e has no place to turn except to the
second corporation. Therefore, as to the injured person, distinctions
between types of corporate transfers are wholly unmeaningful.
Id. at 878. See generally Dick Hoffman, Products Liability for Successor Corporations: A
Break from Tradition, 49 U. COLO. L. REV. 357 (1978).
29. See, e.g., Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 881-82; Cyr, 501 F.2d at 1154. In Cyr,
the court noted that under the facts of the case the mere continuation exception
did not apply. Id. However, the court extended the mere continuation excep-
tion stressing the following policy reasons for imposing successor liability in
tort: that "(1) the manufacturer is better able to protect itself and bear the costs
while the consumer is helpless; ... and (4) the manufacturer is the instrumental-
ity to look to for improvement of the product's quality." Cyr, 501 F.2d at 1154.
30. See, e.g., Ramirez, 431 A.2d at 818; Ray, 560 P.2d at 10. In Ramirez, the
court developed a test to determine successor liability for injuries caused by de-
fects in products manufactured and distributed by a predecessor corporation.
431 A.2d at 812. The court stated in pertinent part:
6
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attaches to a successor who acquires all or substantially all of the
assets of its predecessor and continues essentially the same manu-
facturing operations.3' Since such an approach does not require
that continuity of officers and directors be maintained, continuity
of ownership need not exist for liability to be imposed.3 2
The court in Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co. 3 3 imposed liabil-
ity by relaxing the criteria needed to fall within the mere continu-
ation exception.3 4 Turner involved an injury caused by a press
manufactured and sold by a predecessor corporation as part of a
cash sale. 35 Because the assets were acquired for cash, there was
no continuity of shareholder interest involved in the transac-
tion. 36 Accordingly, the court did not find the successor liable
under the mere continuation exception.3 7 The court, however,
expanded the "mere continuation" exception to include a sale of
assets for cash.3 8 The court emphasized the continuity of the en-
[W]here one corporation acquires all or substantially all the manufac-
turing assets of another corporation, even if exclusively for cash, and
undertakes essentially the same manufacturing operation as the selling
corporation, the purchasing corporation is strictly liable for injuries
caused by defects in units of the same product line, even if previously
manufactured and distributed by the selling corporation or its
predecessor.
Id. at 825. The court developed this standard based upon public policy consid-
erations. Id. The court held that the successor benefitted from the use of the
predecessor's name, reputation, established customer list, and accumulated
goodwill and, therefore, should bear the burdens of continuity. Id.
31. Ramirez, 431 A.2d at 824-25.
32. Id. at 819. The Ramirez court held that "the focus in cases involving
corporate successor liability for injuries caused by defective products should be
on the successor's continuation of the actual manufacturing operations and not
on commonality of ownership and management between the predecessor's and
successor's corporate entities .... Id. (footnotes omitted).
33. Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 874.
34. Id. at 874-75.
35. Id.
36. Id. The court stated that the difference between a stock transaction and
a cash transaction is that in a stock transaction there is a commonality of owner-
ship. Id. at 879.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 883. The court adopted the rule that in the sale of corporate
assets for cash, the following criteria shall be guidelines in establishing whether
there is a continuity between the predecessor and successor corporations: (1)
whether "[t]here is a continuation of the enterprise of the seller corporation, so
that there is a continuity of management, personnel, physical location, assets,
and general business operations;" (2) whether "[t]he seller corporation ceases
its ordinary business operations, liquidates, and dissolves as soon as legally and
practically possible;" and (3) whether "[t]he purchasing corporation assumes
those liabilities and obligations of the seller ordinarily necessary for the uninter-
rupted continuation of normal business operations of the seller corporation."
Id. at 879, 883.
19921
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terprise and looked at the consideration paid as only one element
in the determination of "whether there existed a sufficient nexus
between the successor and predecessor corporations to establish
liability."3 9
A similar continuity of business operations approach has
been employed in cases involving statutory violations. 40 The
Supreme Court has refused to be constrained by the traditional
rule of successor liability when to do so would conflict with public
policy. 4 1 In Golden State Bottling Co. v. N.L.R.B.,42 the Supreme
Court held a successor to an employer corporation liable for the
reinstatement of an employee with backpay. 43 The successor in
this case had acquired the corporation with the knowledge that its
predecessor had illegally discharged the employee. 44 The Court
balanced the conflicting interests of the successor corporation,
the discharged employee, and the general public, finding the in-
terests of the public and employee could be served with a minimal
cost to the successor.45
D. Continuity of Business Enterprise Exception under
CERCLA
Under CERCLA, some courts have recognized a liberal ver-
sion of the "mere continuation" exception, referred to as the
"continuity of business enterprise" exception or "substantial con-
tinuity" exception. 46 This liberalized exception, unlike a strict
"mere continuation" exception, does not require that there be a
39. Id. at 880.
40. FLETCHER, supra note 15, § 7122. See, e.g., HowardJohnson Co. v. Hotel
& Restaurant Employees, 417 U.S. 249 (1974); Golden State Bottling Co. v.
N.L.R.B., 414 U.S. 168, 182 n.5 (1973) ("so long as there is a continuity in the
'employing industry,' the public policies underlying the doctrine will be
served.").
41. See HowardJohnson v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 417 U.S. 249,
257 (1974); Golden State Bottling Co. v. N.L.R.B., 414 U.S. 168, 182 n.5 (1973);
Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977).
42. 414 U.S. 168 (1973).
43. Id. at 181-85.
44. Id. The successor had not committed the unfair labor practice itself but
continued its predecessor's business without a substantial change in operation
or personnel. Id.
45. Id. at 185. The Court held that "[a]voidance of labor strife, prevention
of a deterrent effect on the exercise of rights guaranteed employees . . .and
protection for the victimized employee - all important policies subserved by
the National Labor Relations Act. . . - are achieved at a relatively minimal cost
to the bona fide successor." Id.
46. See, e.g., Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, 909 F.2d 1260, 1265 (9th
Cir. 1990); Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 175 (5th Cir. 1985);
Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1153-54 (lst Cir. 1974).
8
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continuation of stock, stockholders and directors.47 Rather, a de-
termination that a transferee corporation falls within the con-
tinuity of business enterprise exception involves a weighing of
the following factors: (1) whether the successor retains the same
employees, the same supervisory personnel, and the same pro-
duction facilities; (2) whether it produces the same products; (3)
whether it retains the same name; (4) whether it maintains con-
tinuity of assets and general business operations; and (5) whether
the successor corporation holds itself out to the public as a con-
tinuation of the previous corporation. 48
III. CORPORATE SUCCESSOR LIABILrrY UNDER CERCLA
A. Liability under CERCLA
CERCLA was passed in 1980 to provide the federal govern-
ment with means to cleanup hazardous waste sites which pose
threats to public health and the environment. 49 CERCLA autho-
rizes the government to respond to the cleanup of leaking and
inactive or abandoned hazardous sites and to respond to hazard-
ous waste spills. 50 The government may use designated re-
sources under the Superfund 5' for the cleanup of hazardous
47. Louisiana-Pacific, 909 F.2d at 1265.
48. Id. at 1265 n.7; See also Mozingo, 752 F.2d at 175.
49. Act of Dec. 11, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as
amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). CERCLA's prede-
cessor, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), allowed the gov-
ernment to force cleanup of hazardous waste sites only when the site was
considered an imminent danger to the public health or environment. Id. It
could not, however, force a cleanup of inactive waste sites. Id.
50. Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1241 (6th Cir.
1991). CERCLA was enacted to provide speedy cleanup responses to hazardous
waste sites that were improperly managed and to induce voluntary responses to
cleanup hazardous sites. See 5 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6119-20 (1980). CERCLA,
42 U.S.C. § 9601, was enacted in December 1980 for the following purpose:
[T]o initiate and establish a comprehensive response and financing
mechanism to abate and control the vast problems associated with
abandoned and inactive waste disposal sites ... [and] primarily to facili-
tate the prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites by placing the ulti-
mate financial responsibility for cleanup on those responsible for
hazardous waste.
Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1242 (citations omitted).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1986); 26 U.S.C. § 9507(a) (1986). CERCIA estab-
lished the Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund (Superfund), which was
reauthorized in the 1986 amendments to CERCLA, to provide resources which
the federal government may use to cleanup hazardous waste sites in those in-
stances where there is no responsible party. 26 U.S.C. § 9507(a) (added by Pub.
Law No. 99- 499 Oct. 17, 1986). The funds for the Superfund are provided from
general federal revenues and from excise taxes on petroleum, chemical products
and certain corporations. Id. The Superfund is used primarily when no respon-
19921 213
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waste. 52 The government, under its response authority, may sue
any responsible party for reimbursement costs and may seek in-
junctive relief in order to force responsible parties to cleanup
sites that represent a substantial and imminent danger to public
health or welfare. 53 The government is therefore able to respond
instantly and seek reimbursement at a later less critical time. 54
In order to establish liability under CERCLA, the govern-
ment must prove that: (1) the site in question is a "facility;" 55 (2)
there has been a release or threatened release of a hazardous sub-
stance;56 (3) response costs have been incurred; 57 and (4) there is
a responsible party.58 Once these elements have been estab-
lished, strict liability may be imposed upon the defendant.5 9
Often there exist numerous parties which have contributed
to the pollution of a hazardous site. 60 Under such circumstances,
sible party can be found, when the site has been abandoned, or when private
resources prove inadequate. Id.
52. "The degree to which the United States will be able to protect its finan-
cial interest in the trust fund is directly related to the scope of liability under
CERCLA...." United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802,808 (S.D.
Ohio 1983).
53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606(a), 9607 (1986).
54. Id. §§ 9601(23)-9601(25).
55. CERCILA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9). Section 101(9) defines "facil-
ity" as "any building, structure, equipment, pipe or pipeline.., well .... landfill,
storage container, motor vehicle . . ." from which hazardous substances have
been released or "any site or area where hazardous substance has been depos-
ited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located ...." Id.
56. CERCLA § 101(22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1986). Section 101(22) de-
fines "release" as "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying,
discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping or disposing into the envi-
ronment ...." Id.
57. CERCLA § 101(25), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1986). Response costs in-
clude the costs of determining the extent of danger, if any, the costs of remedy-
ing any damage or possible damage, and the costs of enforcing CERCLA. Id.
See United States v. Carolina Transformer, 739 F. Supp. 1030, 1035 (E.D.N.C. 1989).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (1986). For a discussion of responsible par-
ties, see infra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
59. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). See Carolina Transformer, 739 F.
Supp. at 1035-36. "Once the requisite nexus [between the classes and the facil-
ity] is established, each class is strictly liable unless they can prove that under the
defenses enumerated in CERCLA § 107(b)(1)-(4), the release or threat of re-
lease of hazardous substances was caused by unrelated persons or events."
United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984,
991 (D.S.C. 1984) (emphasis added). Liability among all classes of defendants is
joint and several. Id. at 994-95. Challenges to joint and several liability as being
unconstitutionally broad have failed in light of the need to analyze liability on a
case by case basis in order to control the problems created from hazardous
waste. United States v. Seymour Recycling Corp., 554 F. Supp. 1334, 1337-42
(S.D. Ind. 1982).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1986). See Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 90.
10
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CERCLA authorizes the federal and state governments to seek
reimbursement of response costs from any responsible party. 6'
Generally, cleanup costs are borne by either the entity which con-
tributed to the harm caused by the hazardous substance (the "re-
sponsible party") or the government through the federal funds
provided for under the Superfund and, therefore, ultimately by
the taxpayer. 62 Determining which party is responsible is often
an overwhelmingly difficult procedure since many of the hazard-
ous sites were formed decades ago by corporations that have
changed their corporate ownership or simply no longer exist in
any form whatsoever. 63
Responsible parties are defined under CERCLA section 107
to include current owners and operators of hazardous waste facili-
ties or vessels, 64 past owners and operators at the time of disposal
of hazardous waste facilities, 65 persons who arrange for the dispo-
sal or treatment of hazardous substances owned or possessed by
such person, and any person who accepts or accepted hazardous
substances for transport and incurs response costs. 6 6 Therefore,
section 107 includes both producers of hazardous substances and
non-producers who have arranged for their disposal or trans-
port. 67 The term "person" is further defined under CERCLA
section 101 (21) to include a corporation. 68
61. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1986). As to the potential sources, Congress in-
tended to seek reimbursement from the responsible party. 851 F.2d at 90. See
H.R. REP. No. 253(I), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 80 reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2835, 2862.
62. Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 92. For a discussion of funds available under
the Superfund, see supra note 50.
63. See Bernstein, The Enviro-Chem Settlement: Superfund Problem, 13 Envtl. L.
Rep. 10,402, 10,403 (Dec. 1983).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1980). Current owners or operators are strictly
liable for the cleanup of hazardous waste even if the release or threatened re-
lease was not a result of their actions. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759
F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 9608(a)(2) (1986). Prior owners and operators are liable
under CERCLA if hazardous substances were disposed of while they were the
owners. See Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1044.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1986). Transporters are liable under CERCLA
if they accepted any hazardous substance for transport and a release or
threatened release occurs resulting in response costs. See United States v.
Northern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 846-50 (W.D. Mo.
1984), aff'd in relevant part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
67. See CERCLA § 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1986).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21). For statutory language of CERCLA section
107(a)(3), see supra note 2.
The term "person" is defined under section 101 (21) to include an "individ-
ual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, com-
mercial entity, United States government, State, municipality, commission,
19921 215
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CERCLA fails, however, to explicitly state whether a successor
corporation is a "person" for purposes of liability under the
Act. 69 As a result, courts have concluded that Congress was in-
definite as to the extent of successor liability under CERCLA and
therefore have attempted to expand CERCLA liability to include
successor corporations based upon the intent of its drafters.' 0
B. Corporate Successor Liability under CERCLA
The traditional rule of corporate successor liability under
CERCLA follows the common law rule of nonliability and has
adopted its exceptions. 71 The traditional rule of nonliability pro-
vides, in general, that a corporation which purchases the assets of
another corporation does not succeed to the liabilities of the
transferor corporation. 72 The emerging trend of law indicates
that the majority of states apply a looser construction of CERCLA
section 107(a)(3) in an attempt to further the drafter's interpreta-
tion of CERCLA's objectives. 73
The drafters of CERCLA intended to seek reimbursement
from "responsible parties"'74 and their successors because both
benefitted from use of the hazardous substance. 75 The successor,
for instance, may have obtained economic benefits because the
assets purchased by the successor do not reflect their true value. 76
political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21)
(emphasis added).
69. United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1306 (E.D. Mo. 1987). CER-
CIA section 9601 does not define the term "corporation" or "association" as
used in the subchapter and in this regard is textually incomplete. See Anspec Co.
v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1246-47 (6th Cir. 1991). See supra
note 68 for definition of "person".
70. See Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex, 851 F.2d 86, 92 (3d
Cir. 1988); United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 739 F. Supp. 1030, 1038-
39 (E.D.N.C. 1989); United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15 (D.R.I.
1989); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 809 (S.D. Ohio
1983).
71. Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 92.
72. Id. For a discussion of the traditional rule and its exceptions, see supra
notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
73. See Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex, 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir.
1988); In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings re Alleged
PCB Pollution, 712 F. Supp. 1010 (D. Mass. 1989); United States v. Carolina
Transformer, 739 F. Supp. 1030 (E.D.N.C. 1989); United States v. Chem-Dyne,
572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4). For a discussion of responsible parties, see
supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
75. Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 92.
76. See United States v. Crown Roll Leaf, Inc., No. 88-831, (N.J. Oct. 20,
1988) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist. File).
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Implicit in the value of these assets are potential cleanup costs
from hazardous substances which were a result of producing the
predecessor's goods.77 In contrast, the general public benefits
only indirectly, if at all, from the use of the hazardous
substances. 78
Furthermore, some courts have concluded that when a fed-
eral statute is ambiguous or silent, courts should develop national
uniform rules to protect overriding federal interests. 79 Because
Congress, in enacting CERCLA, failed to address successor liabil-
ity, courts have looked to principles of corporate law to develop a
federal common law to supplement CERCLA.80 The develop-
ment of such federal common law ensures the federal interest of
prohibiting businesses from escaping liability by locating in states
with less stringent laws. 8' Therefore, courts having recognized
that strict adherence to CERCLA may conflict with the remedial
policies underlying the statute, have responded by interpreting
CERCLA in a flexible manner.8 2
C. Recent Caselaw Discussing the Exceptions to the
Traditional Doctrine of Corporate Successor Liability
In Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex,s3 the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held the general doctrine of corpo-
rate successor liability applicable in CERCLA contribution
claims.8 4 In Smith Land, the purchaser of land sought contribu-
77. Id.
78. Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 92.
79. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67
(1943); Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex, 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir.
1988); In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceeding Re Alleged PCB
Pollution, 712 F. Supp. 1010, 1013 (D. Mass. 1989).
80. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex, 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir.
1988); United States v. A. & F. Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ill. 1984);
United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 809 (S.D. Ohio 1983). In
establishing federal common law, a court may consider state common law as
long as the state law is compatible with and furthers CERCLA's purposes. Chem-
Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 808. See also 126 CONG. REC. H 11,787 (daily ed. Dec. 3,
1980).
81. United States v. Bliss, Nos. 84-2086C(l), 87-1558C(l), 84-1148C(1),
and 84-2092C(1) (E.D. Mo. Sept. 27, 1988).
82. See Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 92. A strict adherence to CERCLA may cut
off the government's ability to seek reimbursement from responsible parties for
the cleanup of hazardous waste sites and, accordingly, my result in great ex-
pense to the taxpayer. Id. See also In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor
Proceedings re Alleged PCB Pollution, 712 F. Supp. 1010 (D. Mass. 1989);
United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 739 F. Supp. 1030 (E.D.N.C. 1989).
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tion from the previous owner for expenses incurred in the
cleanup of hazardous waste on the premises. 85 The court found
that successor liability was appropriate in order to prevent avoid-
ance of liability due to a mere change in ownership. 86 The court
looked to Congressional intent in developing its decision. 87 The
court held that it "must consider national uniformity" and should
follow "[t]he general doctrine of successor liability in operation in
most states ... rather than the excessively narrow statutes which
might apply in only a few states."'88
The rationale for the holding in Smith Land was followed by
the Ninth Circuit in Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc.89 Louisi-
ana-Pacific involved an asset purchase transaction in which the
court recognized an expanded version of the mere continuation
exception under CERCLA.90 In Louisiana-Pacific, an action was
brought for recovery of costs for the cleanup of hazardous sub-
stances. 9' The court determined that successor liability was ap-
plicable under CERCLA in the context of an asset purchase. 92
The court held that successor liability is controlled by federal
common law. 93 In applying federal common law, however, the
court concluded that the successor was not liable because it did
not meet the requirements of the traditional rule of successor lia-
bility or any of its exceptions.94 Specifically, the court noted that
there had been no exchange of stock between the predecessor
corporation and the successor corporation.95 Accordingly, the
court held that there was not sufficient evidence to find that the
85. Id. at 88-89.
86. Id. at 91.
87. Id. at 91-92.
88. Id. at 92.
89. 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990).
90. Id. at 1265-66.
91. Id. at 1262.
92. Id. at 1262-63. For a discussion of Smith Land, see supra notes 83-88 and
accompanying text.
93. Id.
94. 909 F.2d at 1264-66. The court first applied the de facto merger excep-
tion, finding this exception was not met because there was no continuity of
shareholders. Id. at 1264-65. The successor acquired the corporation with cash,
a promissory note, and the payment of some of the predecessor's debts. No
stock, however, was involved. Id. The court then applied the continuity of busi-
ness enterprise exception finding the exception inapplicable because the succes-
sor corporation did not have actual notice of the predecessor's potential
CERCLA liability and the successor did not continue in the successor's "slag"
business. Id. at 1265-66. The predecessor had produced a by-product named
"slag" which had reacted with another substance requiring substantial govern-
mental cleanup. Id. at 1262.
95. Id. at 1265.
14
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asset purchase was a de facto merger.96 Further, the court ad-
dressed the successor's potential liability under the continuity of
business enterprise exception. 97 The court refused, however, to
address whether this expansive version of the mere continuation
exception was an appropriate standard under CERCLA. 98
In Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co. v. Burlington N.R.R., 99 the District
Court of Minnesota held that a purchaser of the assets of a corpo-
ration could not itself be held liable under CERCLA on the the-
ory that the successor corporation was a mere continuation of its
predecessor. 00 The court refused to adopt the continuity of
business enterprise version of the mere continuation excep-
tion.10' Rather, the court applied the traditional mere continua-
tion exception finding the successor corporation could not be
held liable because there had been no continuation of stock,
stockholders or directors.' 0 2 The court further noted that such
an expansive version of the traditional doctrine was inappropriate
because under the traditional doctrine of successor liability CER-
CLA's remedial purposes would not be frustrated. 0 3 Recovery in
this instance could be obtained from the dissolved corporations
and corporate officers and employees who were responsible for
the decisions respecting the hazardous substances. 0 4
96. Id. at 1265-66. For a discussion of the de facto merger exception, see
supra note 21 and accompanying text.
97. Id. For a discussion of the continuity of business enterprise exception,
see supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
98. Id. at 1266. The court, in a footnote, stated. that when applying the
continuity of business enterprise exception courts shall, look at several elements
such as a continuity of employees, supervisory personnel and physical location;
production of the same product; retention of the same name; continuity of gen-
eral business operations; and whether the purchaser is holding itself out as a
continuation of the seller. Id. at 1265 n.7. The court further stated that it need
not decide whether to adopt this exception because it was inapplicable to the
facts at issue. Id. at 1265.
99. 772 F. Supp. 443 (D. Minn. 1990).
100. Id. at 448. The court held that the successor could only be held liable
under the mere continuation theory if there was a continuity of shareholders. Id.
101. Id. at 449.
102. Id.
103. Id. The court held that the majority of jurisdictions apply the tradi-
tional doctrine of successor liability along with the traditional four exceptions.
Id. The court further stated that in the minority ofjurisdictions where the con-
tinuity of business enterprise exception is applied, it is only "applied in situa-
tions where a rigid application of the majority rule would produce an inequitable
outcome or frustrate a statutory purpose." Id.
104. 772 F. Supp. at 449.
21919921
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IV. UNITED STATES V. DISTLER
In Distler, the government sought contribution for response
costs incurred in the cleanup of hazardous waste sites previously
owned by Angell Manufacturing Company. 0 5 The dispute en-
sued over who was responsible for the improper disposal of haz-
ardous substances which the government and Angell
Manufacturing Company had contracted to clean up in 1976.106
In 1979, Ang Manufacturing Company (Ang) was formed to
purchase the assets of Angell Manufacturing Company (An-
gell).10 7 An asset purchase agreement was entered into by Ang to
purchase substantially all of the assets of Angell.' 08 Ang
purchased the equipment, inventory, and physical plant and as-
sumed only those liabilities specified in the contract.10 9 The lia-
bilities contracted for, however, did not include CERCLA
violations. 1" 0 Ang subsequently changed its name to the Angell
Manufacturing Corporation (Angell II), and to the outside world
appeared to be the same corporation as its predecessor,
Angell. " II
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Kentucky denied Angell II's motion to dismiss the government's
claim. The court determined that the government had asserted a
valid cause of action against Angell II as a successor corpora-
tion. 1 2 The court, following the principles of Smith Land, deter-
mined that the doctrine of successor liability was applicable under
CERCLA section 107(a)(3).' 3 The court concluded that Con-
gress intended the courts to develop common law to supplement
sections 101 and 107 of CERCLA which define "persons" or
"corporations" liable for response costs."14 Additionally, the
court held that successor liability furthers CERCLA's remedial
purpose by holding responsible parties accountable for hazard-
105. Distler, 741 F. Supp. at 638-39. For a discussion of response costs in-
curred, see supra note 3.
106. Id. at 638.
107. Id. at 638-39.
108. Id. Angell later dissolved and distributed the remaining assets to its
shareholders. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Brief for Defendant at 3, United States v. Distler, 741 F. Supp. 637
(W.D. Ky. 1990) (No. C88-0200 L(A) & C88--0201 L(A)).
111. Distler, 741 F. Supp. at 639.
112. Id. at 643.
113. Id. at 640. For facts and reasoning of Smith Land, see supra notes 83-88
and accompanying text.
114. Distler, 741 F. Supp. at 640.
16
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ous waste cleanup." 15
Once the court determined that the doctrine of successor lia-
bility was applicable, the court then had to determine which ver-
sion of the doctrine of successor liability to apply: the mere
continuation exception (traditional doctrine) or an expanded ver-
sion of the mere continuation exception (the continuity of busi-
ness enterprise exception).' 16 The court looked to Smith Land for
guidance and found that courts should apply successor liability in
a way that furthers the goals of CERCLA. I t 7
The court first applied the traditional doctrine (mere contin-
uation exception) and determined that Angell II would not be lia-
ble under this theory because there had been no identity of
shareholders or directors involved." i8 The court then applied an
expanded version of the mere continuation exception and found
Angell II liable as Angell's successor." 9
The court determined that the successor corporation was a
mere continuation of the transferor because it retained essentially
the same employees and management, operated out of the same
plant, produced the same products, held itself out to the public as
the same company, retained the same operating assets, and suc-
ceeded to all liabilities necessary to prevent the interruption of
the daily business operations. 20 The court held that an ex-
panded version of the traditional doctrine was necessary to ad-
vance CERCLA's objectives noting that "[t]o permit Angell [II] to
avoid liability in this case would clearly be a victory of form over
substance and contrary to congressional intent. ... 21
V. ANALYSIS
Distler represents an expansion of liability under CERCLA.
115. Id. The court held "that the common law doctrine of successor liabil-
ity fulfills CERCLA's remedial purpose by making responsible parties rather
than taxpayers liable for hazardous waste clean up." Id. For a discussion of
CERCLA's objectives, see supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
116. Distler, 741 F. Supp. at 641.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 642. The transaction was an asset acquisition which necessarily
did not involve a transfer of stock. Id. Despite the fact that management re-
mained essentially the same, Angell's officers and directors had changed. Id.
For a discussion of mere continuation exception, see supra notes 24-26 and ac-
companying text.
119. Id. at 642-43. For a discussion of the expanded version of the mere
continuation exception, see supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
120. Id. at 643.
121. 741 F. Supp. at 643.
1992]
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The court found the successor corporation liable not under tradi-
tional common law principles of corporate successor liability, but
under an expanded version of the traditional common law. t 22
The court extended liability beyond the express language of
CERCLA to further the drafters' intent to provide for successor
liability which operates to prevent corporations from avoiding re-
sponsibility through a mere change in ownership.' 23
It is suggested that the court's basis for imposing liability was
rational.' 2 4 A corporation which is in essence a continuation of
its predecessor should not be permitted to avoid liability by se-
lecting a state which applies a more restrictive view of the tradi-
tional rule of successor liability.' 25 However, as sound as this
reasoning may be, it is submitted that a strict reading of CERCLA
would not permit such an outcome.
Congressional intent may be helpful in guiding a court's de-
cision, but should not be dispositive.126 It is submitted that the
legislators set forth in section 107 of CERCLA those parties who
should sustain response costs and, therefore, only those parties
should be held accountable. 27
Furthermore, applying traditional common law principles of
corporate successor liability and its exceptions to the facts of Dis-
tier would not result in finding the defendant liable. 128 The court
122. Id. For a discussion of the expanded version of the mere continuation
exception, see supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
CERCLA's objectives, see supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
123. Id.
124. For a discussion of the court's reasoning, see supra notes 113-17 and
accompanying text.
125. For a discussion of the development of national uniform federal rules
to prohibit corporations from purposefully escaping liability, see supra notes 79-
82 and accompanying text.
126. Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 174-75 (5th Cir. 1985).
127. For a discussion of responsible parties under CERCLA, see supra notes
64-70 and accompanying text.
128. DistLer, 741 F. Supp. at 642. In Distler, the successor did not expressly
or impliedly assume the predecessor's CERCLA liability and therefore did not
fall under the first exception. See Brief for Defendant at 3, United States v. Dis-
tier, 741 F. Supp. 637 (W.D. Ky. 1990) (No. C88-0200 L(A) & C88-0201 L(A)).
In addition, the transaction involved a purchase of stock for cash, causing the de
facto merger exception to be inapplicable. 741 F. Supp. at 642. The third ex-
ception fails because there was no evidence of a fraudulent purpose. See Brief
for Plaintiff at 20, United States v. Distler, 741 F. Supp. 637 (W.D. Ky. 1990)
(No. C88-0200 L(A) & C88-0201 L(A)). Finally, the mere continuation excep-
tion is inapplicable because there was no continuity of shareholder interest; the
predecessor's shareholders and directors did not became shareholders or direc-
tors of the successor. 741 F. Supp. at 642. For a discussion of the four excep-
tions, see supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
18
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was able to impose liability only by expanding upon one of the
traditional exceptions, the "mere continuation" exception. 29
Additionally, it is submitted that CERCLA's policies are ad-
vanced without imposing successor corporate liability. Under the
statute, the owner or operator of the property is potentially liable,
the actual polluter is potentially liable, and successor corpora-
tions are potentially liable to the extent they are polluters, owners
or operators. 30 Where a potentially liable party does not exist,
the Superfund is available as a source of funds for cleanup.' 3 '
VI. IMPACT
Developing environmental cleanup law through litigation has
led to inconsistent results, leaving the law unsettled as to the ap-
plication of successor liability in CERCLA cases. The recent deci-
sion in Distler, which expands the doctrine of corporate successor
liability, only adds to the already existing confusion concerning
which parties are accountable under CERCLA.
Added to this confusion is the fact that predecessor corpora-
tions often dissolve, become insolvent, or change their corporate
form and are often incapable of assuming response costs.' 3 2 As a
result, most courts impose liability on the purchaser of the haz-
ardous assets. 33
The indefiniteness of the law places a higher risk upon a
purchasing corporation. As a result of Distler, the purchasing cor-
poration will be compelled to perform an extensive study of the
potential acquiree corporation to determine whether it is poten-
tially liable under CERCLA. The increased cost of performing an
environmental audit, combined with the increased risk implicit in
the transaction stemming from the indefinite state of the law, may
prohibit the potential purchasing corporation from acquiring the
assets of another corporation. On the other hand, if the law is
more clearly defined, the risk will be determined more easily. Be-
cause the risk will become quantifiable, it can be a negotiable fac-
tor in the overall purchase price of the assets of the acquiree
129. 741 F. Supp. at 642-43.
130. For discussion of the responsible parties under CERCLA, see supra
notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
131. For a discussion of the Superfund, see supra note 50 and accompany-
ing text.
132. See Norman W. Bernstein, The Enviro-Chem Settlement. Superfund Problem,
13 ENVrL. L. REP. 10,402, 10,403 (Dec. 1983).
133. Id. By placing liability on successors, courts can eliminate the problem
of collecting judgments against insolvent prior owners. Id.
1992] 223
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corporation. 134 The purchasing corporation, therefore, can make
an informed decision when acquiring the assets of another corpo-
ration. Accordingly, the successor corporation will be better pre-
pared to bear its share of the cleanup costs.
Successor liability as defined in Distler, therefore, imposes
great responsibility upon successor corporations who lack infor-
mation and financial resources to solve problems created by their
predecessors. Thus, Congress must clearly define a successor's
potential liability in order to avoid further confusion and in order
to ensure private contributions to the cost of cleanup.
Susan M. Girard
134. Compare Turner v..Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 882-83
(Mich 1976). The court stated that in the area of products liability, once corpo-
rations are aware of their potential successor liability, then they can prepare for
it. Id. at 883. For instance, the successor may acquire products liability insur-
ance, provide for indemnification agreements or escrow accounts or negotiate a
lower purchase price. Id. The court stated that "[n]egotiations may be complex,
but, with familiarity, they should become a normal part of business transac-
tions." Id.
20
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